Datawritten.xml and Downloadstatus.xml in Torrential Downpour: What to Look For

If you handle Torrential Downpour cases, you will hear “we have the logs” early and often. The problem is that “the logs” can mean anything from a screenshot to a narrative summary to the raw artifact set that actually lets you test the claims.

This post is a lawyer-friendly guide to the highest-value Torrential Downpour artifacts—especially Datawritten.xml and downloadstatus.xml—and what to look for when you receive them.

If you’re still getting oriented on the big picture, start here:

• Torrential Downpour RoundUp software
• Torrential Downpour single-source download

The “crown jewel” concept (why these files matter)

When a case turns on tool outputs, your goal is to obtain artifacts that:

• Are run-specific (tied to the particular IP:port and time window),
• Are machine-generated (not re-typed narrative),
• Preserve enough detail to audit the tool’s conclusions.

That’s why defense teams often focus on a small set of “crown jewel” artifacts. They are frequently the closest thing you’ll get to an audit trail.

Naming note: exact filenames and folder structures can vary by Torrential Downpour Receptor version and deployment. When you request these artifacts, ask the government to identify the tool/version used and confirm the artifact names that version produces.

Why timestamps and verification deserve their own checklist items

Two issues create outsized litigation risk in TD cases: time and verification.

• Time matters because an IP attribution story is only as good as the timestamps and time zones used across tool logs, ISP returns, and device artifacts. If clocks are off or time zones are mixed, the “same event” may not be the same event. If you need a technical anchor for why disciplined time sync matters in networked logging, see the NTP specification [1].
• Verification matters because summaries are easy to overstate. A defensible record should show what was transferred and how integrity was checked. Hash functions are a common integrity primitive, and NIST’s Secure Hash Standard is the baseline reference [2]. For a lawyer-oriented explanation of hashing and chain-of-custody concepts, see Lucid Truth Technologies’ primer [3].

What each major TD artifact generally contains

Below is a practical “what this file is usually used to show” map. (Different versions/agencies may export different fields.)

Datawritten.xml

Generally used to support what data was written/assembled during a run, along with timing and piece/completion context.

What to look for:

• Timestamps: start/end times, per-piece/per-block events (if present), and time zone consistency.
• Target endpoint: does the record tie writing activity to the specific target IP:port for your case?
• Completeness signals: how does it represent “complete,” “partial,” “verified,” etc. (labels vary).

downloadstatus.xml

Generally used to support progress over time: what was attempted, what succeeded, and whether the tool claims completion.

What to look for:

• State changes over time (start, pause, resume, complete).
• Error conditions (timeouts, retries, failures).
• Consistency with the narrative: does the “single-source” story match what the status record actually shows?

details.txt

Often a human-readable summary: peers, connections, transfers, and sometimes verification statements. Treat it as helpful—but not as a substitute for the underlying structured artifacts.

What to look for:

• Whether it references multiple peers even when the affidavit claims “single-source.”
• Whether it uses ambiguous verbs like “downloaded,” “shared,” “confirmed,” without linking to concrete events.

torrentinfo.txt

Used to support torrent identifiers/metadata relevant to the run.

What to look for:

• The infohash and any identifiers used for correlation.
• Whether the torrent metadata context matches what the affidavit claims the target was sharing.

netstat.txt

Often used to support socket/port context at a given time: listening ports, established connections, and endpoint pairs.

What to look for:

• Whether the target IP:port is actually present.
• Whether there are additional connections that complicate a “single-source” narrative.

Practical review checklist (do this every time)

Use this as a first-pass checklist when the production arrives:

• Timestamps
  • Are all logs in the same time base and time zone?
  • Do the run start/end times make sense relative to the affidavit and ISP records?
• Target IP/port consistency
  • Does every artifact point to the same target endpoint?
  • Are there any sessions/entries referencing other endpoints during the alleged “single-source” window?
• Piece completion
  • Do the artifacts show actual piece/block activity consistent with the claim?
  • Do they show partial-only activity when the affidavit implies a complete file?
• Verification
  • Is there any evidence of integrity verification beyond narrative summaries?
  • If verification is claimed, what specific log fields/events substantiate it?
• Discrepancies
  • Do structured artifacts contradict the summary exports?
  • Are there gaps that suggest missing files, missing time ranges, or overwritten outputs?

Red flags (things that should jump off the page)

• Impossible transfer speeds or completions that do not match the timeline.
• Gaps in logs during the key window (especially if the narrative assumes continuous activity).
• Inconsistent time references (UTC vs local time without explanation).
• Multiple peers observed during a window described as “single-source.”
• Mismatched target endpoints (one IP:port in affidavit, another in artifacts).
• Overly clean summaries with no underlying structured support.

A short preservation note (so you can actually litigate the defects)

These artifacts only help if they are produced in a way that preserves their context:

• Ask for the entire exported folder for the run, not just selected files.
• Ask for the version and any export method used, because fields and filenames can vary.
• Ask for hashes of the production set (or a declaration describing how integrity was preserved) so you can detect later changes.

NIST’s guidance on integrating forensic techniques into investigations is a helpful reference point for why preservation and reproducibility matter in digital evidence workflows [4].

Template: “expert request list” (what to send your forensic consultant)

When you retain a consultant, send a short, organized package:

• Affidavit + warrant + return
• All TD exports (PDFs, screenshots, summary reports)
• Raw TD artifacts (the full folder/set for the run), including:
  • Datawritten.xml
  • downloadstatus.xml
  • details.txt
  • torrentinfo.txt
  • netstat.txt
• Any packet capture (if it exists), plus hashes/chain-of-custody notes
• ISP return (subscriber info + timestamps)
• Device forensic report (what was found on disk, if anything)

How to ask for these logs in discovery (high-level language)

You want to be specific and session-tied. Here is a high-level template you can adapt:

“Produce the complete Torrential Downpour Receptor artifact set and exports for the investigative session(s) involving [target IP], [target port], and [date/time window], including but not limited to Datawritten.xml, downloadstatus.xml, details.txt, torrentinfo.txt, and netstat.txt (or their functional equivalents for the specific Receptor version used). Produce the folder structure as exported/preserved, including configuration files and any session identifiers necessary to interpret these artifacts.”

That language reduces the chance you receive only a summary.

Bottom line

If your defense strategy depends on auditing “single-source,” “downloaded from target,” or “verified,” you need the structured artifact set—not just a narrative. These files are where inconsistencies and overstatements are most often exposed. If your case posture involves “one download” or partial-transfer probable cause framing, see: Partial torrent download probable cause warrant.

If you want help translating a production into a targeted checklist for your specific case posture, contact Lucid Truth Technologies using the LTT contact form: Contact.

Continue reading

• Torrential Downpour single-source download
• Torrential Downpour hash value probable cause
• BitTorrent CSAM file not found defense

Not legal advice

This article is for informational purposes and does not provide legal advice. Every case turns on specific facts and controlling law in your jurisdiction. Work with qualified counsel and, where appropriate, a qualified expert.

References

[1] D. L. Mills, J. Martin, J. Burbank, and W. Kasch, “Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms Specification (RFC 5905),” RFC Editor, 2010. [Online]. Available: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5905

[2] National Institute of Standards and Technology, “Secure Hash Standard (SHS) (FIPS 180-4),” NIST, 2015. [Online]. Available: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf

[3] Lucid Truth Technologies, “Digital Hashing for Lawyers: Understanding the Essentials for Criminal Defense,” Lucid Truth Technologies, 2025. [Online]. Available: https://lucidtruthtechnologies.com/digital-hashing-for-lawyers/

[4] K. Kent, S. Chevalier, T. Grance, and H. Dang, “Guide to Integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident Response (SP 800-86),” NIST, 2006. [Online]. Available: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-86.pdf